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How do Economic Circumstances Determine Preferences?
Evidence from Long-run Panel Data
TOM O’GRADY∗
Preferences for redistribution and social spending are correlated with income and unemployment risk, but it
is unclear how these relationships come about. I build a theory emphasizing that only large changes in eco-
nomic circumstances provide the information and motivation needed for people to change their preferences.
Stable long-run preferences are shaped mainly by early socialization, which includes economic and ideolog-
ical influences from the family, and early labor market experiences. Enduring shocks, low intergenerational
mobility and the tendency of left-wing parents to be poorer generate correlations between circumstances
and preferences. Because preferences are stable, greater inequality may not increase aggregate support for
redistribution. Support is found for the theory with panel data from Switzerland, using a range of empirical
tests.
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Across time and cultures, strong correlations exist between individuals’ economic circumstances
and preferences, but it is unclear how these relationships come about. A large literature argues
that they are causal: lower income and a higher risk of unemployment are seen as key drivers
of support for redistributive social policies.1 In the political behavior tradition, however, as well
as for economists interested in culture, voters hold views that may be fundamentally at odds
with their own material interests, and are motivated primarily by long-term values formed by
socialization.2
This study aims to resolve these conflicting predictions using a new theoretical framework,
as well as a novel dataset and empirical strategy. Doing so is important because the two different
conceptions of opinion formation have very different political implications. If voters base their
opinions on their own economic circumstances, then changes in their circumstances translate
into changes in preferences: voters respond to falling incomes or rising inequality by demanding
more redistribution. It also means that more unequal countries will show greater support for such
policies, and that politics revolves around clashes between constituencies of voters who fight for
their own economic interests, including conflicts between voters who face a high probability
of becoming unemployed, and others who do not.3 But if preferences are based on long-term
∗ Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA (email:
tom.d.ogrady@gmail.com). I wish to thank the editor, three anonymous reviewers, Ben Ansell, Adam Berin-
sky, Charlotte Cavaille, Tom Cusack, Jeremy Ferwerda, Jens Hainmueller, Torben Iversen, Dan de Kadt, Dean
Knox, Stephanie Rickard, David Singer, Kathy Thelen and Teppei Yamamoto for useful suggestions and com-
ments. This study uses data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), which is based at the Swiss Cen-
tre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS). The SHP is financed by the Swiss National Science Founda-
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1 See Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006; Finseraas 2009; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009, 2011; Rehm,
Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012; Stegmueller 2011
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values, then changes in individual economic circumstances may do very little to alter the policies
that voters support, and countries’ relative support for social policy may not depend on their
levels of inequality or economic insecurity.
I address two questions. First, when and how do preferences change in response to changing
economic circumstances? And second, why is there such a strong association between economic
circumstances and preferences? I argue that much of the time, people rely on longer-run values
as a heuristic to guide their preferences, and are unlikely to shift their views in response to
short-run changes in their economic circumstances. Only large changes in individual economic
circumstances cause changes in preferences, because they provide information and motivation
that help people understand how their needs have changed.
Occasional large changes in circumstances can only partly explain why the poor and at-risk
are more supportive of redistribution and social spending. To complete the picture, long-run
preferences also arise as a result of early socialization, which is not simply an ideological or
cultural process. It involves the long-lasting impact of economic experiences, too. The views of
the young, whose preferences are unusually malleable, are shaped by their family’s economic
and political background, as well as early experiences in the labor market. Low intergenerational
mobility, the tendency of left-wing parents to be poorer, and the persistence of early labor market
experiences all generate a long-term correlation between circumstances and preferences. Hence
people’s long-term preferences for social policy are based on their long-run economic interests,
in line with economic theories of permanent income, even though economic circumstances do
little to change preferences in the short run.
This is tested with a unique long panel study from Switzerland that combines information
on respondents’ changing economic circumstances and preferences with detailed information
on their background. In the rest of the paper, the current literature is briefly discussed, before
developing the theory. The dataset is then introduced, and cross-sectional regressions are used to
obtain partial correlations that are in the same direction as previous studies. I then move beyond
them, looking at over-time relationships using fixed-effects regressions and an analysis of the
impact of large changes in circumstances. After that, the influence of respondents’ backgrounds
is examined, and the results are discussed in light of past findings.
I find strong support for the theory. Preferences are quite stable and unresponsive to income
and unemployment risk, but can sometimes be altered by large changes in circumstances, partic-
ularly deteriorations, although here the evidence is most tentative. By comparing cross-sectional
and fixed-effects regressions, I also argue that previous cross-sectional studies have probably
over-stated the causal role of changes in economic circumstances in altering preferences toward
social policies, although they provide an excellent guide to partial correlations between the two.
In addition, there is evidence of a strong role for early socialization in shaping long-run opinions
and generating an association between voters’ circumstances and preferences. In short, prefer-
ences and circumstances are strongly correlated at the individual level, but resistant to change
over time. Greater inequality may not increase aggregate support for redistributive policies, even
when opinion is polarized along class lines.
ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND POLICY PREFERENCES: AN UNRESOLVED DEBATE
Two sets of studies paint different pictures of preferences for redistribution and social policy.
The first emphasize the primacy of material interest, whereas the second emphasize the role
of long-run ideologies. Both offer important insights into the nature of preferences for social
policy, but cannot fully explain empirical patterns across individuals, countries, and time.
How do Economic Circumstances Determine Preferences? 3
Studies from the first group begin with the median voter model, which argues that voters’ in-
comes determine preferences.4 Higher income inequality raises support for redistribution, since
the median voter has more to gain from such policies. In addition, welfare states insure voters
against shocks such as unemployment. As a result, those at higher risk of unemployment should
also be more supportive of redistributive social spending, since they have a higher probability of
one day needing to rely on it.5 An important implication of these theories is that changes in vot-
ers’ circumstances translate into changes in preferences: voters will respond to falling incomes
or rising inequality by demanding more redistribution, for example.6
This focus on material interest as the driver of preferences contrasts with a second group
of studies from political psychology and political behavior, as well as the cultural economics
literature. In these approaches, preferences are based on long-term values, which may differ
across countries. They argue that preferences can be fundamentally at odds with immediate
material interest, are usually formed early in life through socialization processes, and are fairly
impervious to subsequent changes such as in economic circumstances.7
Models based on voters’ material interests provide a clear explanation for an empirical reg-
ularity found across time and cultures: the striking correlations between individual economic
circumstances and preferences. Poorer and more insecure voters are more supportive of social
policy. However, the aggregate empirical evidence is not fully consistent with their theoretical
predictions. Voters have not responded to higher inequality by demanding that governments take
more action to reduce income differences. Support for such policies is also generally lower in
more unequal countries where the median voter would gain more from redistribution, and both
rich and poor voters respond similarly to changes in inequality.8 One likely explanation is the
models’ underlying assumption that voters have full information about their own interests, and
how these link to policy. Whether this applies in reality to income and unemployment risk is
uncertain. For instance, the connection between unemployment risk and social spending may be
hard to understand; voters arguably lack the information needed to connect the two.9 If voters do
not grasp the relationships between their circumstances and the policies that would help them,
they may not change their policy preferences in the expected direction when their circumstances
change.
The second approach has been successful in explaining preferences in areas outside of redis-
tribution and social policy, such as government health provision and immigration. Here, material
interest generally plays only a minor role in preference formation, precisely because it is often
difficult for voters to connect their own circumstances with the relevant policy, unless its poten-
tial costs and benefits to the individual are large and very easy to assess. This is most likely to
4 Meltzer and Richard 1981
5 Cusack et al. 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Rehm 2009, 2011; Rehm et al. 2012
6 Other studies examine how national economic conditions affect preferences (e.g. Blekesaune 2006; Stevenson
2001). These variables would be crucial for explaining movements in aggregate opinion. This study looks instead at
how voters’ own economic circumstances affect their preferences.
7 See Alesina and Glaeser 2005; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Feldman 2003; Luttmer and Singhal 2011; Sears
et al. 1980; Sears and Funk 1990, 1999. Long-term values can include perceptions of whether other people deserve to be
helped, which in turn also shape preferences for social policy: see Aarœ and Petersen 2014; Cavaille and Trump 2015;
Van Oorschot 2006.
8 See Corneo and Gruner 2002; Georgiadis and Manning 2012; Kelly and Enns 2010; McCall and Kenworthy 2008;
Svallfors 2003. Note that a focus on income and unemployment risk in shaping preferences can in principle explain
why preferences at the national level are out of line with inequality, because the joint distribution of unemployment risk
and income differs across countries in important ways: see Rehm et al. 2012.
9 Barber, Beramendi, and Wibbels 2013
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occur when a policy unambiguously affects a small or very well-defined group of voters.10 But
based on these studies, it remains unclear why economic circumstances are so well correlated
with preferences for redistribution and social spending: policies that affect almost all voters, in
different and often subtle ways. If economic circumstances play only a minor role in preference
formation, why are poorer voters so much more supportive of these policies?
Before developing a theory to answer this question, it is important to note that it is also
difficult, at present, to distinguish between these existing theories empirically. A typical setup
involves cross-sectional surveys of individual voters, estimating regressions which relate re-
spondents’ opinions to their income and measures of their unemployment risk. Although the
correlations in these analyses clearly conform to theoretical expectations, such findings are also
consistent with theories that emphasize socialization and long-term values. Despite using rich
sets of controls, there may be unobserved characteristics that determine attitudes to the welfare
state and are also correlated with income and risk. Equally, preferences may be formed early
in life, and be stable over time but correlated with economic circumstances. Below, I use an
empirical strategy that allows for this unobserved heterogeneity.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Clearly, voters respond to their material interests under certain circumstances. Rather than ask-
ing whether their interests affect preferences, I develop a framework that shows when and how
it matters, and when it does not. This begins with a familiar idea from behavioral economics:
voters are boundedly rational.11 People are capable of connecting their economic circumstances
to policies that would help them, but often lack the motivation to fully think through how their
circumstances matter, and do not always make full use of the information that is available to
them. Instead, they often fall back on readily-available heuristics that help them act as if they
are well-informed.12
This means that changes in people’s economic circumstances will not alter their preferences
when the cognitive costs of doing so are high, relative to relying on heuristic shortcuts. In partic-
ular, whether or not preferences change in response to economic circumstances will depend on
the size of the change. Small, regular changes in circumstances will do little to alter preferences
because the changes are not materially significant, and may be easily foreseeable in advance,
providing little motivation to alter political views. Thinking through how these changes matter
and connecting them to a relevant policy requires both high information, and high political en-
gagement. The informational, cognitive and opportunity costs of such behavior would be high
for most voters. This leads to the first hypothesis for testing:
HYPOTHESIS 1: There is no relationship between small, regular changes in economic circum-
stances and preferences for social policy and redistribution.
Large changes in circumstances are much more likely to lead people to change their prefer-
ences. It is much easier to understand the link between large changes in circumstance and pol-
icy. Such changes are likely to provide new information about individual economic prospects,
motivating people to reconsider their own beliefs and interests. For instance, it becomes both
10 Campbell 2002; Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001; Green and Gerken 1989; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Sears
et al. 1980; Sears and Funk 1990
11 Simon 1982
12 Tversky and Kahneman 1974
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more worthwhile, and easier, for a voter to re-consider which welfare policies would help them
if they suddenly face the prospect of imminent unemployment. Overall, such a combination
of increased motivation and information provides a highly favorable environment for voters to
make sound political judgements in line with their objective interests.13 This leads to the second
hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: Large improvements (deteriorations) in economic circumstances lead to de-
creased (increased) support for redistribution and social policy.
In the absence of cues from rapidly changing economic circumstances, people will fall back
on other readily-available heuristics, particularly long-run ideological values, which provide an
easy guide to how to approach political questions without fully thinking them through. These
values are often formed through socialization early in life: a person’s background affects the
type of long-term, stable values that they hold about welfare and redistribution. In part, this
reflects the influence of parents in passing on ideologies.14 Here, long-term values arise as a
cultural phenomenon, as people assimilate the values of their parents. This leads to hypothesis
three:
HYPOTHESIS 3: People whose parents were more left-wing will be more supportive of social
policy and redistribution.
However, socialization is not merely about cultural values being passed on between gener-
ations. It is also an economic process, because youth is a time when material interest is more
likely to change preferences. The “impressionable years” theory shows that political attitudes
are quite unstable in late childhood and early adulthood, but more stable thereafter, for two rea-
sons. First, adolescence and early adulthood are associated with many major life events that are
significant enough to cause people to revise their fundamental preferences, and second, young
people are psychologically more open to change.15
Youth, therefore, is a time when the barriers to opinion change - lack of information, and
low motivation - can be overcome, because young people’s economic experiences convey a lot
of novel information, and they require less motivation to change their views to begin with. For
instance, living in poverty during a person’s formative years will alter their sense of their long-
run interests and economic potential at a time when they are already more receptive to new
ideas. Perhaps the most important way in which young people experience poverty is through the
economic position of their parents. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4: People whose families experienced economic hardship in their formative years
will be more supportive of social policy and redistribution.
The other way in which young people come to understand their economic interests is through
early labor market experiences. Experiencing rising wages in their youth, for instance, can cause
people to revise up their long-run economic prospects. It provides a similar “jolt” to large and
sudden changes later in life. This is the final hypothesis for testing:
13 Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, and Rich 2001
14 Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Sears et al. 1980
15 Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Dinas 2013; Jennings and Markus 1984; Neundorf, Smets, and Garcia-Albacete 2013;
Sears and Funk 1999
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HYPOTHESIS 5: People who experience big gains (declines) in their economic standing during
their formative years will be less (more) suppportive of social policy and redis-
tribution.16
Importantly, the last four hypotheses all lead to preferences correlating with people’s con-
temporaneous economic circumstances, in line with the empirical evidence. When large changes
in circumstances are permanent, or a person’s current economic position reflects a history of
shocks, such correlations will emerge. However, not everyone experiences large changes in cir-
cumstance very often. Many people are born poor and stay that way, but usually their preferenes
are aligned with their poverty. That is why the familial channels also matter. Intergenerational
mobility is limited; poor parents tend to raise children who are, on average, poor as well. Thus
the fourth channel (familial poverty) leads to a correlation between people’s own economic
circumstances and their preferences. Likewise, parents who are more left-wing are likely, on
average, to be poorer, which has the same effect. Finally, the fifth channel (early labor market
experiences) also leads to a lasting correlation between circumstances and preferences, because
early economic circumstances have persistent effects on earning and employment prospects.
This means that poorer people can be strongly supportive of social policy while still relying
on their longer-term values to guide political preferences most of the time. In that sense, this
theory is consistent with the political pyschology and political behavior literatures. The crucial
difference to other policy areas, such as health and immigration, is that these processes happen
to all voters. Everyone is directly affected by economic changes, and grows up in different
economic and cultural circumstances. Voters are more likely to form views on social policy
that align with their material circumstances compared to other policy areas, because they are
more likely to have relevant personal experiences that enable them to form a reasonable view of
their own interests. This helps explain why redistributive preferences are somewhat unusual in
showing very clear correlations between material interest and preferences, and it will make these
preferences more stable over time than in other areas, where voters are less certain of where their
long-run interests lie. Adopting this perspective also helps explain aggregate empirical findings
on preferences and rising inequality, if inequality typically changes in a way that is too slow-
moving to cause people to re-consider their interests.
The theory proposed here is consistent with theories emphasizing that permanent income or
long-run economic position is more important than contemporaneous income in guiding eco-
nomic behavior, such as consumption.17 More broadly, it clarifies rather than contradicts past
approaches based on material interest: some authors already endorse the view that only large
changes in circumstances will change preferences.18 Empirically, the theory suggests that co-
efficients from past cross-sectional regressions give an accurate picture of the partial correla-
tions between economic circumstances and preferences, reflecting respondents’ permanent eco-
nomic position, economic socialization, and history of economic shocks. Nonetheless, because
only large changes in economic circumstances can change preferences, they are likely to over-
estimate the causal effect of a one-unit change in income or unemployment risk on preferences.
16 Consistent with this, growing up in a recession has a big impact on preferences (Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2014),
people anticipating upward mobility have lower support for redistribution (Alesina and La-Ferrara 2005), and shocks to
family income in childhood alter the likelihood of voting as an adult (Finseraas 2017)
17 Browning and Crossley 2001
18 As Rehm et al. 2012, p. 404 put it, “although attitudes toward social protection are likely to be fairly enduring,
they should nonetheless be responsive to large changes in risk exposure or economic standing.”
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DATA
Individual-level panel data is necessary for this study, for three key reasons. First, testing hy-
pothesis 1 requires uncovering the causal relationship between preferences and changes in eco-
nomic circumstances. Panel data is better suited for this, because the impact of variables such
as ideological values that are formed early in life and do not change over time, but cannot be
observed directly, can be controlled for. The causal effect of changes in economic circum-
stances can therefore be captured under the much weaker assumption that all heterogeneity is
time-invariant.19 Second, in order to test hypothesis 2, we need to directly observe individual
changes in economic circumstances. This is only possible with panel data. And third, testing the
other three hypotheses requires information on the family backgrounds and early experiences of
individuals. Uniquely, my panel dataset has both.
I use the Swiss Household Panel Survey, which has interviewed a large group of people
repeatedly each year since 1999, adding a new sample to the panel in 2004, allowing me to
observe individual preferences over an unusually long period. The SHP not only details income
and unemployment risk, but also asks about political opinions, in every year of the panel from
1999-2009 and in 2011. These twelve waves of data covering thirteen years are used (2010 and
also 2012, the latest available wave, did not include the required variables).
Two dependent variables are used in this study. The first is a question that asks “Are you
in favour of a decrease or in favour of an increase in federal social spending?” The potential
responses are “in favour of an increase”, “neither” or “in favour of a decrease”. These are pre-
sented to respondents as an ordered scale (“neither” is separate to “don’t know”). This variable
does not split out social spending into different categories, making this paper most comparable
to studies such as Iversen and Soskice 2001 and Rehm 2009, which focus broadly on social
spending and redistribution. Nonetheless, in one wave only (2011), the SHP also asked respon-
dents for their opinion about spending on unemployment benefits. A comparison of the two
variables, shown in Figure S1 in the Supplementary Material, shows that opinions about general
social spending and unemployment benefits in 2011 are highly related: the two variables appear
to reflect the same dimension of preferences.
The variable also specifically references federal social spending. In Switzerland, some wel-
fare programs, including immediate poverty relief, are reserved to governments in small admin-
istrative regions known as Cantons. The federal government controls unemployment, sickness
and disability insurance, setting contribution and replacement rates and playing a redistributive
role via subsidies for the poor, as well as heavily regulating health insurance.20 Because its
role is mainly in overseeing insurance schemes, federal social spending in Switzerland offers a
particularly good test of insurance-based models. One concern might be that because the appro-
priate role of the federal government is a politically salient issue in Switzerland, the answers to
this question instead reflect preferences over federal versus local control of spending. The SHP
also asks respondents how much confidence they have in the federal government. As shown in
Figure S2 in the Supplementary Material, the mean response to this question does not follow any
clear pattern across the three opinion groups for social spending, which is not what would be
expected if opposition to social spending simply reflects opposition to the federal government.
19 Some studies, such as Iversen and Soskice 2001, try to control for survey respondents’ “ideology” using left-right
scales derived from the party supported. But this is not the same concept as fundamental values.
20 Obinger et al. 2010
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The SHP does not ask directly about redistribution, and so the second dependent variable
uses a question which instead asks about a redistributive policy: “Are you in favor of an in-
crease or in favour of a decrease in the tax on high incomes?” The potential answers are the
same as above. This question taps a redistribution motive, since higher taxes on the rich are
redistributive, in that such taxes directly reduce differences in post-tax earnings. Models em-
phasizing material interest would again predict that lower income and higher unemployment
risk cause higher support.21
There are two key independent variables of interest for this paper. The first is household
income. It is measured pre tax and transfers, as in the Meltzer-Richard model and previous
studies, and is adjusted for inflation to allow over-time comparisons. Because the SHP surveys
multiple members of the same household, and income is shared within households, I use house-
hold income (as previous studies have also done). It would be unrealistic, for example, to treat
both halves of a married couple as only earning their own individual salary. However, I focus
on changes over time, and some changes in measured household income are due to changes
in household composition, rather than labor income. And a given income level will yield very
different standards of living, dependent on household size. I therefore use a measure of income
adjusted by an equivalence scale. Such scales are standardly used in the economics literature to
compare household income over time.22
The second key independent variable asks respondents for a subjective assessment of their
risk of unemployment. It asks “How do you evaluate the risk that you will personally be un-
employed in the next 12 months, if 0 means ‘no risk’ and 10 ‘a very high risk’?” The variable
thus provides an 11-point scale from 0 to 10, allowing for considerable variation in risk. In
contrast to previous studies that have used objective risk measures based on national occupa-
tional unemployment rates or skill specificity, this measure accords directly with the theoretical
models, which suggest that perceived risk should matter.23 In addition, the subjective measure
is also likely to more accurately reflect individuals’ particular circumstances, such as their own
employer or regional economy.
Nonetheless, it is important to verify that this variable reflects the actual risk of unemploy-
ment, rather than just noisy responses to a survey question. For four different sources of variation
in unemployment, Figure 1 plots mean Swiss unemployment rates in different groups, and com-
pares them to the mean subjective unemployment rate amongst respondents in those groups.
All waves of data are pooled together; averages across waves are calculated. Panels (a) and
(b) show that the young and poorly-educated have higher unemployment rates; panel (c) shows
21 Not all respondents may answer this question with redistribution in mind. Nonetheless, it is a valid test of the
material interest theories provided that a substantial enough proportion of respondents do so.
22 See Jenkins 2000. The SHP uses the modified OECD equivalence scale, which is derived from economic models
of the household. The guiding principle is to bring all household incomes to a level that would give the same level
of welfare to a single-person household. Consider a one-person household earning 50,000 Fr versus a two-person
household earning 50,000 Fr. One way to compare these two households would be to use unadjusted household income.
But this ignores the fact that a given income level is worth very different amounts, dependent on household size. The
other extreme would be to focus on per capita income, but this ignores the fact that there are substantial economies
of scale enjoyed by households due to sharing fixed costs. Instead, the OECD equivalence scale divides household
income for a two-person household by 1.5, yielding an equivalized income of 33,333 Fr (meaning that a single-earner
household would need an income of 33,333 Fr to enjoy the same standard of living). If this notional couple were to
divorce into two single-earner households earning 25,000 Fr each, our dataset would record their incomes as having
fallen by 8,333 Fr, rather than 25,000 Fr (if we did not adjust household income) or 0 (if we used per-capita income).
Hence the equivalence scale substantially reduces the impact of changes in income that are due to demographic changes.
This represents, therefore, a pragmatic and standardly-used middle-ground between these two extremes.
23 Rehm et al. 2012
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(c) Regions (Classified by Unemployment Rate)
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Fig. 1. Unemployment Rates and Subjective Unemployment Risk in the Swiss Household Panel Survey, by Group
Note: Data come from the SHP, Eurostat and Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Panel (b) divides education levels
into three groups defined by Eurostat: Level 1 (elementary only or some secondary), Level 2 (advanced sec-
ondary) or Level 3 (tertiary). Panel (c) looks at 7 Swiss regions defined by the Federal Statistical Office, grouping
them into three groups defined by regional unemployment. The “high” group shows average unemployment in
the two regions with the highest unemployment rate, Ticino and Geneva. The “middle” group includes Zurich,
Espace Mittelland and North-West Switzerland. The “Low” group shows Central and East Switzerland.
that there are also regional differences. In each case, subjective risks clearly reflect these actual
differences. Panel (d) looks by occupation. I calculated national unemployment rates for eight
categories of occupation in the ISCO-88 System (an objective measure of unemployment risk
explained in detail by Rehm 2011). Here, while those in the lowest-risk occupations (technicians
and professionals) have lower risk assessments, not all professions show strong correlations. But
overall, Figure 1 demonstrates that differences in subjective unemployment risk clearly reflect
actual differences in unemployment rates.
To check that changes over time in individuals’ subjective unemployment risk are also mean-
ingful, Figure 2 compares the evolution of mean subjective unemployment risk amongst SHP
respondents to the national unemployment rate, over the course of the panel. It reveals a remark-
ably close relationship between the two. In the Supplementary Material, Figure S3 shows that
changes in unemployment rates amongst each occupational group also closely track changes
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Fig. 2. Swiss Unemployment Rate and Mean Subjective Unemployment Risk in the Swiss Household Panel Survey
in mean subjective risk assessments amongst respondents in those professions: subjective risk
assessments are updated to reflect changes in objective risk over time.
Clearly, the SHP can be used to examine the impact of changes in unemployment risk and
income on preferences for higher taxes on the rich and higher social spending over a long period.
Before doing so, it is worth noting what this study does not set out to achieve. First, although the
end of the panel covers the financial crisis, Switzerland experienced a relatively mild recession,
and was generally stable and growing over the period covered by this study. This means that
we cannot make inferences about how individual preferences might change in a period of major
economic crisis. Second, all individuals in the dataset are employed (who, in any case, are the
main focus of theoretical models of unemployment risk), because the SHP does not ask people
out of work about their subjective unemployment risk. This paper does not examine the impact
of unemployment itself on preferences.
Finally, the focus is on Switzerland alone, because no other country features individual-level
panel data that would render the theory testable. In particular, the SHP is completely unique
in combining data on preferences over a very long period with extensive family background
information. This means that caution should be exercised in generalizing the results, although
this field is arguably now at a stage where most progress can be made with multiple single-
country panel studies. As some leading scholars in the field recently noted, “ultimately, political
researchers require ongoing panel surveys...that trace both economic experiences and political
attitudes over long spans of time.”24 In terms of its fit with the literature on welfare states, in
the past the Swiss welfare state has often been characterized as having “liberal” characteristics,
with a relatively minimal welfare state. But it underwent a dramatic expansion over the 1980s
and 1990s before stabilizing over the period covered by the panel, making it more redistributive
24 Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2013, p. 43. In fact, two previous panel studies exist. Margalit 2013 studies
voters in California from 2007 to 2011, showing that losing a job has a short-lived impact on preferences, but finds little
evidence that falls in income or rises in job insecurity matter. Stegmueller 2013 uses the British Household Panel Survey
to compare the impact of permanent and transitory oncome, showing that the former is more important for preferences.
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and similar in size and structure to neighboring countries with “continental” insurance-based
welfare states.25
DATA DESCRIPTION
The initial dataset for analysis contained 44,790 person-year observations for 10,655 individuals
over 12 waves from 1999-2009 and in 2011. Respondents aged 18 or over at the time of inter-
view are used. While item non-response is rare for the key variables, many individuals were
not asked certain questions because the particular question was not relevant to them. Hence this
initial sample excludes retired people (for whom unemployment risk is not relevant). There is
also some attrition from the sample over time in the SHP. To make inferences about changes
over time, at least two observations per individual are required, so that the sample used in this
paper consists of 41,979 person-year observations of 7,844 individuals. Table S1 in the Supple-
mentary Material compares summary statistics for the sample to people who appeared in one
wave only. Across all variables there are virtually no differences between the two groups. On
average, individuals appear for five different waves. They usually appear in consecutive waves,
but there are occasional gaps in participation.
This panel is unusually long, giving an unprecedented picture of the long-run stability of
preferences, both individually and in aggregate. Figure 3 looks at the stability of support for
higher social spending and higher taxes on the rich. The top two diagrams look at aggregate
stability, showing the percentage of respondents holding a particular view at each wave. The
bottom two diagrams look at individual stability, showing whether or not sample members hold
the same view in any subsequent wave as they held in the first wave they appeared in. They
display the percentage of respondents holding the same view, or changing by 1 point up or down
on the 3-point scale. The figure shows results only for those who began participating at the start
of the panel, in 1999, and those who began as part of the replacement sample, in 2004 (wave
6), to abstract from any changes in the composition of the sample over time. It includes both
all participants regardless of when they left the panel, and the subsample of participants who
remained in the panel for every wave until the end, with no gaps in participation, allowing a
comparison of the two.
The top two diagrams of Figure 3 show that aggregate preferences were quite stable over
time, although there is a slight shift of opinion against social spending. Those who remained
for the full six or twelve year periods without gaps exhibit very similar behavior to the sample
as a whole. Higher taxes on the rich were very popular throughout the panel: just under 80%
of respondents were in favor, while just over 40% favored higher social spending. The bottom
two diagrams show that for taxing the rich, around three-quarters of respondents continued to
hold the same attitude even twelve years on, whilst around three-fifths of respondents did so for
social spending. A sizeable proportion of the sample also tended to change by 1 point. But the
most significant movement - from supporting higher spending, to not supporting it, for example
- was rare. Overall, preferences were quite stable over time.26
25 Armingeon 2005; Lane and Maeland 2001; Obinger et al. 2010
26 One worry could be that there is measurement error in the way that people answer these survey questions. As
emphasized by Prior 2010, a respondent’s measured attitude may fluctuate from period to period simply because their
true attitude lies somewhere between “neutral” and “support.” But in this case, such measurement error is likely to lead
to the data overstating rather than understating the variability of opinion.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of Opinion over Time
Note: Straight lines show all relevant participants regardless of when they left the panel; dotted lines show only
the fully balanced sample.
DATA SETUP AND CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS
Before estimating the causal effects of circumstances under weaker assumptions, cross-sectional
relationships are examined. These are intended as a comparison to the previous literature, rather
than to act as a test of the theory. Previous studies have looked at these correlations using
multivariate regressions, and therefore I now do the same thing, with a similar set of control
variables. The results are shown in Table 1.
All person-time observations are pooled together, estimating models with dummies for each
wave. Household income is logged, since the distribution is heavily skewed. In addition, all
models include a standard set of demographic controls: gender (a dummy equalling 1 if the
respondent is female), indicators of education (a dummy for “low education” which includes
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TABLE 1 Cross-Sectional Models
Support for Higher Social Spending Support for Higher Taxes on Rich
(3-pt. Scale) (3-pt. Scale)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Income (log) -0.018* -0.026* -0.065* -0.063*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemployment Risk 0.005* 0.003* 0.0004 0.0005
(11-pt. Scale) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.080* 0.077* 0.044* 0.044*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Low Education -0.034 -0.026 -0.055* -0.055*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
High Education 0.090* 0.066* -0.037* -0.034*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Age (years) 0.009* 0.008* 0.005* 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 -0.0001* -0.00008* -0.00006* -0.00006*
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Constant 0.714* 0.66* 1.402* 1.386*
(0.075) (0.073) (0.068) (0.069)
Wave Dummies yes yes yes yes
Canton Dummies no yes no yes
N 41,979 41,979 41,979 41,979
R2 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03
∗p < 0.05; standard errors are clustered by household
those who did not complete basic high school, and a dummy for “high education” which includes
college graduates), age, and age squared. Switzerland is a federal country, and so there may be
strong regional effects on preferences. Thus models 2 and 4 also include dummies for Canton of
residence (27 in total). These results are displayed separately because this subnational variation
has not been captured in past studies. Both wave and Canton dummies proved to be highly
significant, but are not shown for reasons of space.
For ease of interpretation, OLS models were used, with the dependent variables re-coded on
a 3 point scale where 0=oppose, 0.5=neutral and 1=support. Sampling for the SHP is carried
out at the household level, meaning that the dataset contains multiple individuals from the same
household. Standard errors are therefore clustered at the household level in all models, which
also accounts for clustering at the lower level of individuals within households.27 Table S2 in
the Supplementary Material shows that none of the conclusions from Table 1 are changed using
ordered logit models, or logit models which code “support” as 1 and are equal to 0 otherwise.
27 A small number of people - about 5% of the total sample - changed households during the panel. In order to verify
that this does not affect the results, all models in this paper were also re-estimated with clustering by individual. The
results were in all cases unchanged.
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For the models for social spending, the results show that both income and subjective unem-
ployment risk are significantly associated with a preference for higher preference in the expected
directions. For example, in model (1), a 10% rise in income and a 1-point rise in unemployment
risk are predicted to lead respectively to a 0.003-point fall and a 0.005-point rise in support for
higher social spending on the scale of length 1. In terms of the direction of the coefficients, these
are the same patterns that have been shown in the previous literature. The estimated coefficients
are relatively small; the coefficient for income is somewhat smaller than has been typically
found across the OECD countries in previous studies. For higher taxes on the rich, meanwhile,
income is significantly negatively associated with a preference for higher taxes in both models,
with the coefficient somewhat larger than for social spending. Unemployment risk correlates in
the correct direction but is not significant. The results are also not affected by the inclusion of
cantons. In the main, therefore, these results show that Switzerland exhibits similar patterns of
support to previous studies: preferences mostly differ by income and unemployment risk in the
directions that we would expect.
CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND PREFERENCES
Here, models with individual fixed effects are estimated. These regressions capture the causal
effects of economic circumstances under the weaker assumption that any unobserved hetero-
geneity is time-invariant, effectively using “each individual as his or her own control.”28 Math-
ematically, they are identical to regressions that are specified as differences from over-time
averages for each individual. This means that if, in general, changes in economic circumstances
cause changes in preferences, this effect will be picked up in the estimated coefficients. The
models are designed to test the first hypothesis, namely the idea that individuals do not adjust
their preferences directly in response to circumstances. This theory implies that we should find
a null result: once we are able to control for long-standing, unoberved characteristics of individ-
uals that lead to a correlation of economic circumstances and preferences (such as ideological
values formed early in life), the partial correlations observed in the pooled cross-sectional data
between economic circumstances and preferences should disappear.
Because individuals are tracked for up to twelve years, changes in preferences could be
determined by changes in policy. However, in the Swiss case, this is very unlikely to be an
issue. After two decades of reform, the period from the late 1990s to the present has been marked
by stability in Swiss welfare policies, social spending and taxation.29 This is demonstrated in
Figure S4 in the Supplementary Material, which shows that social spending as a percentage of
GDP fluctuated only mildly over the panel between 18% and 20%, with no evident trend, and
that tax rates on the rich were almost completely unchanged in every year. In addition, Figure
3 provides very little evidence of aggregate shifts in either dependent variable, which we would
expect to see if people were responding ‘thermostatically’ to changing policies.30
Nonetheless, in case there is any impact from policy changes that are not captured by Figure
S4 or in the aggregate opinion data, dummy variables for the waves are included. They control
for wave-specific effects, such as a sudden change in spending, that could cause respondents
to change their average preference, allowing the regressions to capture the additional impact of
individual economic circumstances. The final wave dummy (12) had to be dropped to allow age
28 Allison 2009, p. 1
29 Armingeon 2005; Obinger et al. 2010
30 Soroka and Wlezien 2005
How do Economic Circumstances Determine Preferences? 15
TABLE 2 Models with Individual Fixed Effects
Support for Higher Social Spending Support for Higher Taxes on Rich
Income (log) -0.004 -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
Unemployment Risk 0.0004 0.0016*
(11-pt. Scale) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Low Education -0.040 0.001
(0.034) (0.037)
High Education 0.015 -0.00005
(0.014) (0.012)
Age (years) -0.013* 0.007*
(0.003) (0.002)
Age2 0.0001* 0.000005
(0.00003) (0.00002)
Constant 1.005* 0.620*
(0.078) (0.062)
Wave Dummies yes yes
Canton Dummies yes yes
N 41,979 41,979
∗p < 0.05; standard errors are clustered by household
to appear in the regressions, since age is perfectly collinear with time at the individual level.
This omission is unlikely to be material, however, as the results are not affected by omitting the
wave dummies altogether, which is consistent with the very stable policy environment over the
panel (see Table S3 in the Supplementary Material).
The fixed effects results are shown in Table 2. Again, standard errors are clustered by house-
hold, and models are estimated by OLS. They have the same controls as Table 1 including
cantonal dummies, with the exception of gender, since it is constant over time. The results no
longer show any evidence of a statistically significant relationship between preferences for so-
cial spending and either income or unemployment risk. For taxes, income remains significant at
the 5% level, but the estimated coefficient is about six times as small relative to the comparable
cross-sectional model. These results are clearly consistent with Hypothesis 1.31 In contrast to
the cross-sectional results, unemployment risk positively affects preferences for taxes, and is
significant at the 5% level. This result for higher taxes is explained below, when I look at the
impact of large changes in circumstances.
For now, two potential issues, primarily affecting the social sending regressions, need to be
discussed. First, there could be “ceiling effects”, where a substantial fraction of the fraction
of sample members are already at the maximum possible value of the 3-point scale for support
when their economic circumstances change, so that further increases in preferences cannot be
31 Table S4 in the Supplementary Material shows that the results are robust to collapsing the dependent variable to a
2-point dichotomous variable equalling 1 if the respondent is in favor and 0 otherwise. In addition, the Meltzer-Richard
model focuses on relative income, meaning that income changes could only matter to the extent that they cause people
to change their place in the income distribution. Table S4 therefore also shows a model where income is converted into
deciles; the results are also unchanged.
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detected. However, this ought to be more of an issue for the regressions involving taxing the rich,
since a substantially higher proportion of the sample is at the maximum value for this variable
(Figure 3). Yet it is for taxation where we do find significant effects for the key variables. As
a further check, Table S5 in the Supplementary Material looks only at people who began their
first wave in the middle category. The results are unchanged.
More importantly, whether or not these results genuinely indicate the lack of a causal rela-
tionship depends on how precisely they are estimated, which is affected by how much over-time
variation exists in the independent variables. But a comparison of Table 2 to Table 1 shows that
the standard errors for the key variables are not larger in the fixed-effects models than in their
cross-sectional counterparts. Differences from the cross-sectional setups are driven by large
falls in the coefficients, rather than by falls in precision, meaning that for social spending, the
effects of economic circumstances on preferences are tightly estimated around zero. Moreover,
many respondents go through changes in risk perception and income. 37% of all wave-to-wave
changes in unemployment risk were two points or more, and 43% of changes in income were
20% or more (both in absolute terms). The full distribution of changes is shown in Figure S5 in
the Supplementary Material. Overall, in contrast to the cross-sectional results, it appears that no
regular causal relationship exists for social spending, as the theory predicts, and with taxes and
income, the strength of the true relationship is likely to be over-stated in a cross-sectional setup.
THE IMPACT OF LARGE CHANGES
Hypothesis 2 argues that big changes in economic circumstances can change preferences, be-
cause they provide information and motivation for people to re-consider their interests. This is
the most difficult hypothesis to test, because the SHP features relatively few very large changes
in income or unemployment risk. 5% of total wave-to-wave changes in risk were of five points
or more (up or down), 4% of changes in income involved drops of 50% or more, and 13% of
changes involved rises of 50% or more. Nonetheless, I offer two separate pieces of circumstan-
tial evidence that together suggest that large changes in circumstances, particularly deteriora-
tions, can alter preferences.
First, Figure 4 simply plots the raw data. For different-sized changes between any waves
t and t-1, it compares the proportion of respondents whose preference changes in the direction
predicted by theory, to the same proportion for a baseline group of respondents whose circum-
stances barely changed. This means that diagrams showing falls in unemployment risk or rises
in income involve the percentage of respondents decreasing their preference for social spending
or taxation, and diagrams showing rises in unemployment risk or falls in income involve the
percentage of respondents increasing their preference. Each shows the difference between this
and the equivalent percentage for the baseline group.32
If large changes in circumstances matter but small changes do not, respondents who expe-
rience large changes should change their preferences in the direction predicted by theory more
often than the baseline group. Figure 4 shows that this is indeed the case, in general. For ex-
32 The baselines chosen were changes in unemployment risk of 0 to 1 or 0 to -1, and changes in income of 0% to
20% or 0% to -20%. Thus the left-most observation in the top left diagram plots the percentage of respondents whose
unemployment risk increased by 2-3 points and whose preference for social spending increased, minus the percentage
of respondents whose unemployment risk increased by 0-1 points and preference for social spending increased. The
Figure only includes respondents who were not already at the relevant maximum or minimum before their circumstances
changed. For instance, diagrams showing the impact of rises in unemployment risk only include respondents who did
not already answer “support” in the previous period.
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ample, in the top left diagram we see that those whose unemployment risk rises by 2-3 points
are no more likely to increase their support for social spending than those in the baseline group,
but people who experience larger changes are more likely to do so. Similar patterns exist for
the other three diagrams exploring unemployment risk, with the pattern considerably stronger
for rises in unemployment risk than for falls. When it comes to changes in income, the pat-
tern of very large changes mattering mostly only occurs for falls in income and taxing the rich.
Looking across all 8 diagrams, it is clear that deteriorations in circumstance (where three out
of four diagrams show the expected patterns) are more likely to lead to the expected preference
change than improvements. Although the differences found are quite modest, in the context
of a dataset where few respondents experience very large changes in circumstance, they offer
tentative evidence in favor of the second hypothesis.
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Fig. 4. Changes in Circumstances and Changes in Preferences: Percent of Respondents Changing their opinion
in Direction Predicted by Theory, Compared to Baseline
Note: Diagrams plot the percent of respondents in each group who change their preferences in the direction
predicted by theory, minus the same percentage for a baseline group who did not experience a substantial change
in circumstances.
Second, to further corroborate these findings, I estimated a new set of fixed effects regres-
sions that replace the measures of economic circumstances from Table 2 with dummy variables
for large changes in circumstances, but were otherwise identical. Rises in income were more
common than falls, so I defined large changes as being changes greater than or equal to the 10th
and 90th percentiles of the distribution of changes. In addition, it may take some time for sub-
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Fig. 5. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Big Changes in Circumstances (Regression Coefficients and 95%
Confidence Intervals)
stantially altered circumstances to impact preferences, so as well as large changes that occurred
between t-1 and t, the dummy variables also equalled 1 if the changes occurred at t-2 or t-3 and
were sustained into t.
The results for the ‘big change’ variables are shown in Figure 5, which shows their estimated
coefficients and associated 95% confidence intervals (results for the other coefficients were the
same as Table 2). For three of the four deterioriations in circumstance (rises in unemployment
risk in both cases, and falls in income and taxing the rich), the estimated effects are in the ex-
pected direction, although they do not quite achieve significance at the 5% level (p-values are
between 0.1 and 0.16). This offers further tentative evidence in favor of large deterioriations in
circumstance mattering, and closely mirrors the patterns in Figure 4, but there is greater uncer-
tainty than the results for the other hypotheses in this paper. Overall, substantial deteriorations
in circumstances seem likely to lead people to increase their support for social spending and
taxing the rich, and more rarely, improvements in circumstances could lead to falls in support.
Arguably, deteriorations convey more news to respondents about their economic prospects than
improvements.
Crucially, this provides a first crucial building block in understanding why preferences and
economic circumstances are strongly related in cross section. People who appear poorer in
cross-section may have experienced adverse economic shocks, which changed their preferences
to be in line with their economic situation. This also helps to clarify the original fixed effects
results in Table 2. Those are based on within-person changes, just like Figure 4, and suggest that
unemployment risk is unrelated to preferences for social spending. The results in this section
suggest that while this may be true in a general sense, it is nonetheless the case that very large
changes in unemployment risk can shift preferences for spending. Meanwhile, Table 2 also
indicated a weak general relationship between preferences for taxing the rich and circumstances.
Looking at Figures 4 and 5, it seems that in these cases, the fixed effects regressions were able
to detect the impact of large changes. But they make clear that the original regression results
should be interpreted as only large changes mattering.
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PREFERENCE FORMATION
Now, the SHP’s rich data on its participants’ backgrounds are used to explore the third, fourth
and fifth hypotheses. The third hypothesis states that early socialization affects preferences for
redistribution and social policy through parents passing on their ideological beliefs: people with
left-wing parents will be more supportive of social policy. The fourth argues for economic
socialization: people whose families experienced economic hardship in their formative years
will be more supportive of social policy and redistribution, while the fifth contends that labor
market experiences in people’s formative years change their sense of their long-run economic
standing, which in turn affects preferences.
I begin by looking at ideological and economic socialization within the family (the fourth
and fifth hypotheses), using questions from the SHP that ask respondents about the political
and economic background of their families. The first two questions ask about the political
beliefs of respondents’ parents, asking respondents to place their parents on an 11-point ideology
scale from left to right. Specifically, they say “when you were about 15 years old, where did
your father/mother stand politically, if 0 means “left-wing” and 10 means “right-wing”?” The
sample size is reduced a lot in both cases: almost one-third of respondents did not answer
the question about their father, rising to almost a half for mothers. For ease of interpretation,
these parental ideology variables were collapsed into dummy variables for “left-wing father”
and “left-wing mother”, equalling 1 if the parent was perceived to score a 4 or less on the 11-
point scale (the results also go through using the full scale). If there is socialization within the
family, then people whose parents were more left-wing during their formative years should be
more supportive of higher social spending and higher taxes on the rich.33
The other two variables used in this section focus on economic background. The first uses
information on the occupations of respondents’ fathers, which the SHP places into eight different
occupational categories. I turned them into a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the father
had a lower income profession (including “skilled non-manual”, “skilled manual” and “unskilled
manual or non-manual”). The second is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent
reports that their family experienced “financial problems” during their youth. To fully capture
people who grew up in poorer circumstances, both of these variables were combined into a
single indicator (‘poor family’) taking a value of 1 if the respondent had a low-income father or
a family that experienced financial problems.
Figure 6 displays initial results for the association between these three family background
variables (left-wing father, left-wing mother, poor family) and outcomes, using differences in
means and their 95% confidence intervals. They correlate with preferences in the expected
directions: having a left-wing father or mother is associated with more than a 0.1-point rise
in support for higher social spending on the scale of length 1 and a 0.04-point rise in support
for higher taxation on the rich. The estimated differences are essentially equal for mothers and
fathers, and they are substantively large, being about the same as the difference between men and
women, or low and high educated respondents. Coming from a poor family is associated with
33 I checked whether this variable accurately captures parental ideology by looking at the subset of people whose own
children appear in the dataset, since respondents are also asked the same question about themselves. People are asked
about parents’ ideology when they were 15 years old, but people’s self-reported ideologies are extremely consistent
over time, so an over-time average of the parents’ own reports provides a good proxy for ideology when their children
were 15. Comparing this to the childrens’ reports, it turned out that the mean difference between parents’ and children’s
reports was just -0.19 for fathers and 0.27 for mothers, and only 8% and 13% of children were out by more than 3 points
for fathers and mothers respectively, giving confidence in the measures.
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greater support for these measures by smaller, but positive, amounts. Together, these provide
preliminary evidence in favor of hypotheses 3 and 4.
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Fig. 6. Estimated Differences in Means and 95% Confidence Intervals for Family background variables
Note: In each case, the figure plots the estimated difference in mean response between those that did and did not
possess the relevant family attribute (for example, between those with and without a left-wing father). N=27,260
(left-wing father), 22,571 (left-wing mother) and 35,422 (poor family)
Unsurprisingly, these variables are also correlated with each other - for instance, 35% of
observations with left-wing fathers are from poor families, compared to 22% without left-wing
fathers - as well as other characteristics of the respondents. As a result, I also assessed their
potential impact by including them in pooled cross-sectional regressions that are otherwise iden-
tical to Table 1 (including wave and geographical dummies). These regressions can determine
whether or not parental ideology and economic situation continue to be significantly correlated
with preferences while controlling for the effect of each other, as well as other characteristics.
Because the parental ideology variables result in large reductions of the sample size, models
were estimated containing each separately. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for these
variables are shown in Figure 7 (full regression results are in Table S6 in the Supplementary
Material). All of the estimated partial correlations are in the same direction as Figure 6, and are
only slightly smaller. In the regression for higher social spending containing father’s ideology,
the coefficient on ‘poor family’ is not significant at the 10% level (p=0.22), but otherwise, all
remain significant at the 5% level, or close to it (p=0.06 for the coefficient on ‘poor family’ in
the regression for social spending containing mother’s ideology).
This suggests that, overall, socialization is both economic and ideological in nature. It in-
volves both parents passing on their ideological beliefs, and the long-lasting effects of living in
relative poverty when young. Of course, it is likely that parents’ ideologies were in part based on
their economic situations, so that some of the transmission of ideology between generations may
itself be economic in nature. It may be useful to view the estimated coefficients on parental ide-
ology as an upper bound on the ‘pure’ ideological transmission of values. Nonetheless, parental
ideology and economic situation appear to impact their children’s preferences independently,
although I do not of course claim to have established a definite causal relationship, given the
nature of the data.34
34 One potential issue with these regressions is that they include variables on respondents’ own economic situation
and education levels, which may be an outcome of parental economic situation, and may therefore be inappropriate as
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Fig. 7. Regression Coefficients and 95% Confidence Intervals for Family background variables
These variables are also correlated with respondents’ contemporaneous economic circum-
stances. Specifically, those with a left-wing mother have a subjective unemployment risk that
is on average 0.23 points higher than those without, and equivalent figures are 0.17 for the left-
wing father variable, and 0.23 for the ‘poor family’ variable. Such differences are equivalent
to the difference for those with and without a university education, for example (0.22). For in-
come, observations with a ‘poor family’ had annual household incomes of approximately 7,000
Francs lower than those without, but there turned out to be no substantial difference in average
household income between those with left-wing parents, and those without. Taken together,
this means that part of the explanation for the correlation in cross-section between contempo-
raneous economic circumstances and preferences is that those with lower income and higher
unemployment risk come from more families that were poorer and more left-wing. However,
these differences are quite modest. We need to look for further explanations in order to fully
capture the impact of early life experiences.
To do so, early learning during respondents’ “impressionable years” is now examined, test-
ing the final hypothesis. It states that younger voters are more likely to change their opinions
than older voters, and that therefore, economic changes during people’s youth leave a lasting
impression on preferences. To begin with, Figure 8 examines the stability of preferences by age,
presenting the same analysis as the bottom panel of Figure 3, split by those aged 25 and under in
their first wave, and those over 25 in their first wave, including only those who were in the panel
for 6 waves or more to give a reasonable period over which to assess stability. It shows that
control variables. To check this, Table S7 in the Supplementary Information re-estimates these regressions without the
economic and education variables and shows that the results for parental ideology and family economic background are
largely unchanged.
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Fig. 8. Variability of Preferences by Age Group at Start of Panel
Note: Displays the percentage of respondents holding the same opinion, or changing by one or two points, in any
subsequent wave relative to the first wave.
young respondents were indeed more likely to change their preferences. For social spending,
the preferences of the young are much more variable than the preferences of those over 26. For
taxing the rich, preferences are more stable overall, although the proportion of younger people
changing by 2 points is twice as high as for those over 25. Overall, young people’s preferences
are more variable.
Strikingly, it now turns out that, in general, these changes in preferences amongst the young
are strongly associated with cumulative changes in economic circumstances. To show this, Fig-
ure 9 looks more closely at the two groups appearing in Figure 8, assessing cumulative changes
over people’s youth (those aged 25 and under), versus other ages. Specifically, it plots cumula-
tive changes in preference over these six (or more) waves against the mean cumulative change
in income or unemployment risk associated with each level of preference change. Hypothesis 5
suggests that those who experience large improvements or deteriorations while young are more
likely to change their preferences in the expected direction.
Consistent with this, Figure 9 shows no clear relationship between cumulative changes in
income and preferences for those aged over 25. But for those aged 25 and under, there is a nega-
tive relationship: decreases in preferences for social spending and taxing the rich are associated
with greater rises in income than is the case for increases. With unemployment risk and social
spending, no clear patterns are evident for either group. For taxation and unemployment risk,
a positive gradient exists: increases in preference for taxing the rich are associated with greater
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Fig. 9. Mean Changes in Economic Circumstances since First Panel Wave Compared to Changes in Preferences,
by Age at Start of Panel
increases in unemployment risk than is the case for decreases, and the gradient is much clearer
for the young than the old.
So in three out of four cases, the patterns are as predicted by the theory. There is evidence of
learning from early experiences. When the young experience positive or negative labour market
experiences over a number of years, they are much more likely than the old to change their
preferences in the directions predicted by theory. Now, if it is the case that economic shocks in
one’s youth are relatively enduring, this will also lead to a lasting correlation between income,
unemployment risk and preferences. It is difficult to assess the long-term persistence of labour
market experiences when young in this panel, because respondents appear on average for 5
years. But literature from economics has shown that the effects of economic experiences when
young are persistent, since the early years of a career are often the most vital in establishing
24 O’GRADY
oneself. For instance, youth unemployment has a large impact on wages when much older, and
people who graduate from college during a recession have lower lifetime earnings.35
DISCUSSION
I have shown that, in the Swiss panel studied here, preferences for higher social spending and
taxes on the rich are mostly not based on individuals’ immediate income and unemployment risk,
although large changes - particularly deteriorations - seem to bring about changes in preferences.
Polarization in preferences between income and risk groups emerges as a result of ideological
and economic socialization within the family as well as early economic experiences, combined
with the effects of occasional large changes in circumstance. Preferences are, in general, quite
stable, meaning that cross-sectional regressions may over-state the causal effect of changes in
economic circumstances on preferences. The findings are consistent with the theory that voters
typically rely on long-run values when forming preferences because it is often difficult for them
to connect their short-run economic interests with preferences.
This suggests that material interest operates on preferences in a long-run manner, in line
with economic theories of permanent income, and that insights from the political economy and
political behavior traditions, “literatures...that all too often fail to speak to each other”,36 can
be combined into a unified model. People are boundedly rational; we need to consider when,
not if, they act ‘rationally.’ Constituencies of voters that act in line with their material interest
can form, even when preferences do not always respond to economic circumstances, and are
relatively stable over time. This has important implications. Due to their stability among in-
dividuals, aggregate preferences may not change with inequality or economic insecurity, even
though opinion is polarized by income and risk. And because there is a cultural element to pref-
erences acquired through socialization within the family, countries’ aggregate preferences may
diverge from what might be expected, given their economic structure.
Future work should try to extend this research, although unfortunately, long-run panel datasets
containing information on politics are rare. The findings could differ during crises or in other
countries, or with different dependent and independent variables. For example, changes in un-
employment risk may be more strongly related to changes in preferences for unemployment
insurance, since it may be easier for individuals to connect their unemployment risk to unem-
ployment insurance. I also only had information on unemployment risk, whereas Rehm et al.
2012 rightly point out that a wider range of risks, for example of ill health, are relevant to the
welfare state.37 Clearly, more work is needed to test the influence of a wider range of eco-
nomic considerations on a wider range of preferences, in more countries and at more times,
and to understand how individuals perceive their changing circumstances. For now, this paper
has provided new insights into the relationship between individual economic circumstances and
preferences over long periods of time.
35 Gregg and Tominey 2005; Kahn 2010; Mroz and Savage 2006; Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz 2012
36 Rehm 2011, p. 273
37 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, more nuanced measures of risk could also be useful, such as those
adopted in the immigration literature, which combine people into cells defined by education and levels of work experi-
ence to give a detailed picture of exposure to labor market competition: see Borjas 2003.
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